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Ethics and Disclosure: A Study of the Financial Performance of Firms in the
Seasoned Equity Offerings Market

Abstract
In this article, we examine the association between ethics and disclosure and the impact of this
association on the long-term, post-issue performance of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). We
argue that firms with extensive disclosure are less likely to face information problems, and more
likely to lead to active shareholder monitoring, and therefore, engage in fewer unethical activities,
such as aggressive earnings manipulation, and have better long-term, post-issue performance.
Consistent with these predictions, this study presents evidence that disclosure is negatively
related to unethical earnings manipulation and positively associated with long-term, post-issue
performance. In particular, we find that long-term, post-issue SEO underperformance is
significantly less for firms with extensive disclosure and conservative earnings management than
firms with less disclosure and aggressive earnings management. We interpret this evidence to
mean that over the long run, the capital market values ethical financial reporting and corporate
efforts to incorporate social responsibility into their decision-making processes, for example, by
enhancing information transparency through voluntary disclosure.
JEL classification: G14; G24; G32; M14; M41
Key Words: Ethics, Social responsibility, Disclosure, Earnings management, Seasoned equity
offerings, Long-term, post-issue performance

One of the most significant corporate trends of the last decade is the growth of Corporate
Social Responsibility (CSR).1 More than half of the Fortune 1,000 companies regularly issue
CSR reports and a large number of firms are engaged in a serious effort to define and integrate
CSR into various aspects of their business. Definition of CSR varies, however. Friedman (1970)
first defines CSR as follows: “Corporate social responsibility is to conduct the business in
accordance with shareholders’ desires, which generally will be to make as much money as
possible while conforming to the basic rules of society, both those embodied in law and those
embodied in ethical custom.” McWilliams and Siegel (2001) define CSR as actions that appear
to further some social good, beyond the firm’s interests and that which is required by law. Hill et
al (2007) define CSR as the economic, legal, moral, and philanthropic actions of firms that
influence the quality of life of relevant stakeholders. Barnea and Rubin (2005) suggest that
while definitions of CSR vary, it generally refers to serving people, communities and
environment in a way that goes beyond and above what is legally required of a firm.
While CSR is closely related to ethical issues concerning corporate decision-making and
behavior, recent accounting scandals by such renowned companies as AOL Time Warner, Enron,
Merck, Qwest Communications, WorldCom, Xerox, Parmalat (the European version of Enron),
Daewoo, and SK Global (Korean conglomerates) have raised serious concerns among market
participants about ethical issues in a global world. These companies have disregarded ethics and
placed more emphasis on short-term gains to top management by manipulating their earnings. 2
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See, for example, Tsoutsoura (2004). She suggest that an increasing number of shareholders, analysts, regulators,
activists, labor union, employees, community organizations, and news media are asking companies to be
accountable for an ever-changing set of CSR issues.
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Corporate social responsibility and business ethics are often regarded as the same concepts. However, the CSR
movement is one aspect of the overall discipline of business ethics. The CSR movement arose particularly during
the 1960s with increased public consciousness about the role of business in helping to cultivate and maintain highly
ethical practices in society and particularly in the natural environment.

In this paper, we define unethical firms as firms that manipulate their earnings
aggressively. 3 Similarly, we define ethical firms as firms choosing ethical reporting, i.e.,
conservative earnings management.

In addition, we define more frequent and persistent

disclosures that make the firm’s information environment transparent as socially responsible (or
transparency-increasing) disclosures, similar to the argument made by Gelb and Strawer (2001).
We also define less frequent and non-persistent disclosures that make information environment
opaque as socially irresponsible (or transparency-decreasing) disclosures. Based on these
definitions, we first examine the endogenous relation between ethical behavior in financial
reporting and disclosure. We then examine whether the firms with ethical financial reporting
and socially responsible disclosures perform better financially than unethical firms with less
disclosure in terms of their long-term, post-issue performance in the U.S. seasoned equity
offerings (SEOs) market.
We choose the SEO market because of the well-known evidence indicating that firms
issuing equity inflate their stock price temporarily via earnings manipulation around SEOs and
that market participants fail to adjust for earnings manipulation adequately, leading to postoffering stock underperformance (Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998; DuCharme, Malatesta, and
Sefcik, 2004). Casual observation suggests that there is a wide variation in disclosure strategies.
Some firms communicate continuously with investors through voluntary disclosure, while others
provide very little information.
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Schipper (1989) defines earnings management as “purposeful intervention in the external reporting process, with
the intent of obtaining some private gain to managers or shareholders.” Healey and Wahlen (1999) define earnings
management as follows: Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in
structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic
performance of the company, or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on the reported accounting numbers.
We follow these definitions of earnings management throughout the paper.
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Recently, Jo and Kim (2007) suggest that disclosure frequency is inversely related to
earnings management and positively associated with one-year post-issue performance. However,
while both disclosure and earnings management decisions are endogenously determined, they
address neither the endogenous natures of disclosure and earnings management nor the long-term
consequence of these decisions. We explore the possible relation among ethics, disclosure, and
the long-term consequences of socially responsible disclosure and ethical reporting practices by
investigating long-term financial performance.
We first hypothesize that aggressive earnings management is inversely associated with
socially responsible disclosure, and vice versa. We also hypothesize that firms with aggressive
earnings management and socially irresponsible disclosure tend to have inferior long-term return
performance, to the extent that investors, in general, prefer stocks of ethical companies over
those of unethical companies, and socially responsible firms over irresponsible firms, if other
factors are held constant.
Using the number of press releases by searching press-release wires in the Dow Jones
Interactive (DJI) database system as a measure of disclosure, we find evidence that the
disclosure of U.S. SEO firms is endogenously and inversely associated with our measure of
earnings manipulation: performance-adjusted discretionary total accruals (ADTA), as suggested
by Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005). Additionally, the long-term, post-issue SEO performance
of firms with high disclosure and conservative earnings management is significantly better than
that of firms with low disclosure and aggressive earnings management over the five-year period
after the offering. Based on these results, we conclude that ethical perspectives and social
responsibility make a significant impact on the equity offering market over the long run.

3

This paper contributes to the CSR and financial-performance literature in two ways.
First, to the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first attempt to address the endogenous
association between ethical reporting and socially responsible disclosure (as a part of CSR)
around SEOs. This study is important in light of recent financial scandals suggesting that many
highly reputed U.S. firms disregard ethics and manipulate their earnings. Second, this paper
addresses the relation between the combined effect of ethical reporting and socially responsible
disclosure and its impact on long-term, post-offering SEO performance, and therefore it sheds
additional light on the issue of whether the equity offering market, in general, values social
responsibility through voluntary disclosure and ethical aspects by earnings management over the
long term.

Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Performance
The relation between social responsibility activities and financial performance has been
an important topic of debate at least since 1960. Oberman (2000) refers to academic debates
over CSR even taking place in the 1920s. These debates are still developing and represent some
of the important potential role of CSR and its impact on valuation both dynamic and vital. The
literature we briefly review consists of three principal strands: 1) model predictions of CSR; 2)
empirical relation between CSR and financial performance; and 3) link between socially
responsible investing and CSR.

Model predictions of CSR
We first briefly review theory and model predictions of the relation between CSR and
financial performance. The theoretical model predictions of CSR vary. Some CSR models
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predict that CSR expenditures will increase stock price up to certain point. Navarro (1988)
assumes that CSR spending improves the quantity of sales, while Webb (1996) assumes that
CSR spending improves price. Other model predicts that CSR expenditure will not affect stock
price. In the simple world where there are no frictions, Small and Zivin (2002) develop a
Modigliani-Miller’s (1958) irrelevance result by showing that if the investor optimally wishes to
donate, the two firms’ stock prices will be equal and they will be independent of the level of
donation made. Van De Ven and Jurissen (2005) maintain that although the mainstream of
current thinking in business ethics recognizes that a firm should invest in CSR, the normative
theory of how specific, competitive conditions affect a firm's social responsibility remains
underdeveloped.

Empirical studies of CSR
According to Margolis and Walsh (2003), over one hundred and twenty studies between
1971 and 2001 have examined the empirical relation between CSR and financial performance,
and the results are largely inconclusive. Wood and Jones (1995) and Margolis and Walsh (2003)
suggest that assessments of previous studies are complicated because of the imperfect nature of
many studies, such as measurement problems of both CSR and financial performance, omitted
variable problems, lack of the necessary analysis of causality and/or endogeneity, lack of
methodological rigor in many studies, and lack of theory. Nonetheless these studies stress that
bad social performance is detrimental to a firm’s financial performance.
While it is abstruse to draw a definite conclusion due to the imperfect nature of many
studies, most recent reviews of the empirical CSR literature conducted by Margolis and Walsh
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(2003) and Orlitzky et al (2003) indicate a positive relation between investing in socially
responsible activities and financial performance.

Link between socially responsible investing and CSR
The link between SRI and CSR has also received considerable research attention recently,
particularly in terms of financial performance.4 The value of SRI in financial markets is also, at
best, mixed and inconclusive. While some findings indicate that ethical aspects do not affect the
financial performance of SRI (Hamilton, Jo, and Statman, 1993; Statman, 2000; Kreander, Gray,
Power, and Sinclair, 2005), other studies suggest that creating and implementing ethical codes of
conduct have significant implications for financial communities (Hellsten and Mallin, 2006).
Barnet and Salomon (2006) suggest that various screening criteria of SRI result in different
impacts on financial performance and show that while community-relations screening increases
financial performance, environmental and labor relations screening decreases financial
performance.

Hypothesis: Ethics and Disclosure
While the most researchers focus on the relation between CSR and financial
performance, some researchers have devoted considerable attention to firms’ policies regarding
voluntary disclosure. For instance, previous studies (e.g, Botosan, 1997; Lang and Lundholm,
2000) suggest that equity-issuing firms can increase their stock prices by reducing their cost of

4

There is an increasing trend toward a conscious awareness of ethical issues in the investment community.
According to the Social Investment Forum’s fifth biennial report on socially responsible investment (SRI) trends
(2006), SRI assets grew faster than the entire universe of managed assets in the United States over the last 10 years.
Total socially responsible investment assets rose more than 258 percent from $639 billion in 1995 to $2.29 trillion in
2005, while the broader universe of assets under professional management increased less than 249 percent from $7
trillion to $24.4 trillion over the same period.
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capital through voluntary disclosure. On the other hand, Gelb and Strawer (2001) argue that firms
disclose because it is socially responsible to do so. They maintain that companies have incentives
to engage in stakeholder management by undertaking socially responsible activities and that
providing extensive and informative disclosures is one such practice. Based on disclosure
rankings provided by the annual Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR)
Reports, they suggest that there is a positive relation between disclosure level and CSR and
conclude that increased disclosure is a form of socially responsible behavior. Following Gelb
and Strawer (2001), we use a persistent and frequent disclosure over an extended period as
socially responsible, transparency-increasing disclosure.
The endogenous nature of ethics and disclosure
One possible linkage between ethical reporting and socially responsible disclosure is
through information transparency. To examine the relation between ethical reporting and
disclosure, we first consider their endogenous nature.

In general, we expect that better

information environment through extensive disclosure enhance investor’s awareness of ethical
aspects. For instance, Schipper (1989) argues that the absence of full communication (or the
existence of blocked communication) together with asymmetric information makes it possible
for managers to engage in unethical behaviors, such as earnings manipulation. Consequently, we
expect that corporate incentives for unethical decision making, such as earnings manipulation,
will be high when information asymmetry regarding the firm’s economic earnings is high.
Conversely, with less information asymmetry through persistent and frequent disclosures,
managers will be less likely to manipulate earnings. While the previous discussion suggests that
extensive disclosure reduces the incentive for earnings management, it is also possible that lower
disclosure is induced by a desire to manipulate earnings. Hence, we have:

7

Information Hypothesis: Unethical corporate behavior, such as aggressive earnings manipulation,
is inversely associated with voluntary disclosure, while corporate-responsibility-enhancing
decisions, such as transparency-increasing disclosure, are endogenously determined as a negative
function of earnings management.

Long-term, post-issue SEO performance
The relation between social responsibility activities and financial performance has been
an important topic of debate at least since 1960. Oberman (2000) refers to academic debates
over CSR even taking place in the 1920s. These debates are still developing and represent some
of the important potential role of CSR and its impact on valuation both dynamic and vital.
The literature of agency problems and corporate disclosure can provide an important
insight into the relation between socially responsible disclosure and long-term financial
performance. In their seminal work on agency problems, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest
that outside shareholder monitoring helps reduce the agency costs associated with the separation
of ownership and control. In a related vein, Merton (1987) states that:
“…For example, a newspaper or other mass media story about the firm or its industry that
reaches a large number of investors who are not currently shareholders, could induce some of
this number to incur the set-up costs and follow the firm. Having done so, in our model, these
investors would evaluate the detailed substantive information about the firm, become new
shareholders, and value of the firm would rise. It should be stressed that the current shareholders
may already know all the information contained in such stories. Nevertheless, if the form of the
prior public releases of the information did not capture widespread attention among investors
who do not follow the stock and if the new form does, the firm’s investor base will increase and
the stock price will rise.” (pp. 500-501).
From Merton (1987), we can infer that persistent and frequent disclosures can enhance
investor cognizance or attention, thus enlarging the shareholder pool and increasing shareholder
monitoring. We argue that this increased monitoring, along with the reduction of information
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asymmetry reduces the long-term, post-issue SEO underperformance.

5

In addition, the

monitoring role of disclosure has both concurrent and lasting effects on a SEO’s post-issue
performance. Because investors become new shareholders at various times, the pool of
shareholders increases not only during the pre-offering period but also during the post-issue
period. As a result, outside shareholder monitoring has an almost continuous and lasting impact
on post-issue performance. 6 Furthermore, maintaining a high level of disclosure over an
extended period (even after the offering date) is important to holding investor attention.7
Prior research shows that firms engaging in unethical reporting, such as incomeincreasing earnings management around SEOs, suffer with lower stock price in the long-run. In
particular, Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a, b) and Rangan (1998) find that long-run, post-issue
performance is negatively related to earnings management. This relation between unethical
reporting and long-run underperformance will be stronger when the effect of unethical reporting
is combined with that of socially irresponsible disclosure.
In short, disclosure plays an important role in reducing post-issue SEO underperformance
because corporate self-monitoring and outside market monitoring help reduce agency costs
5

In a similar line of reasoning, Chung and Jo (1996) claim that security analysts’ monitoring of firm performance
helps motivate managers, thus reducing the agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control.
They find that analyst following exerts a significant positive impact on a firm’s market value. Recently, Hartzell
and Starks (2003) suggest that institutional investors also serve a monitoring role in mitigating the agency problem
between shareholders and managers.
6

There are direct and indirect effects of disclosure on post-issue performance. To see these points more clearly, note
first that the relation among post-issue performance (P), disclosure (DL), and earnings management (EM) can be
depicted by the functional form P = f{DL, EM(DL)}. Notice that disclosure has both a direct and an indirect effect
(through its impact on earnings management) on post-issue performance. Next, note that the total derivative of P
with respect to DL is dP/dDL = ∂P/∂DL + (∂P/∂EM)(dEM/dDL), where ∂P/∂DL is the direct effect of disclosure on
post-issue performance and (∂P/∂EM)(dEM/dDL) is the indirect effect of disclosure through earnings management
on post-issue performance. According to our monitoring argument, we expect to have ∂P/∂DL > 0. In accordance
with our information hypothesis, we expect to have dEM/dDL < 0 and according to Teoh, Welch, and Wong
(1998a) and Rangan (1998), we expect ∂P/∂EM < 0. As a result, the total (net) effect (i.e., dP/dDL) of disclosure on
post-issue performance is positive.
7

Regarding earnings management, Rangan (1998) and Jo and Kim (2007) suggest that firms manage earnings even
after the offering due to their concerns over lawsuits and lock-up agreements with underwriters.
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through increased investor attention. Together with previously reported evidence of long-run,
post-issue underperformance of unethical firms, this implication lead us to the following
hypothesis.

Monitoring Hypothesis: (a) Socially responsible disclosure: Long-term, post-issue SEO
performance is an increasing function of socially responsible, transparency-increasing disclosure
because of its monitoring role that reduces agency problems; (b) Disclosure and ethical
reporting: Long-term, post-issue SEO underperformance is largest for SEO firms that engage in
unethical financial reporting and socially irresponsible disclosure.

Data and Research Design
Data description
We obtain an initial sample of all U.S. common stock SEOs that occur between January
1990 and December 1997 from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database. We also
examine post-offering returns up to five years after the offerings (i.e., up to 2002). We search
for press releases (our proxy of disclosure activity) for our sample firms from the press-release
wires in the Dow Jones Interactive (DJI) database system. We limit the sample to firms that are
available on the COMPUSTAT and CRSP (Center for Research in Stock Price) databases.
Offerings by financial institutions are excluded because the nature of these firms’ accruals differs
from that of industrial firms. Our final sample consists of 1,431 offerings. We obtain the
ownership data (institutional ownership, block ownership, and insider ownership) from the
Spectrum of Compact Disclosure. Actual samples used in the analyses are different, since the
data availability varies for each regression analysis. We use the latest data available prior to the
offering announcement.
SEO announcement dates are obtained from the DJI database. We search for SEO
announcements (including intention to file, approval by the company’s board, and stockholders’
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approval) within the two years preceding the SEO filing date reported in the SDC database. When
we cannot find the SEO announcement before the SEO filing date, we treat the SEO filing date as
the SEO announcement date.

Research design
Due to the endogenous nature of ethics and disclosure, we employ a three-stage leastsquares (3SLS) regression to estimate the simultaneous model as follows.

DL = a + b1*ADTA + control variables,

(1)

ADTA = a + b1*DL + control variables,

(2)

where DL is our disclosure measure, an average percentile rank of the number of press
releases per six-month period over M(-4) through M(+3), following Jo and Kim (2007) (see the
calculation of DL in Appendix A); ADTA is our earnings manipulation measure, the annualized
performance-adjusted discretionary total accrual scaled by lagged total assets, following Kothari
et al. (2005). In particular, we estimate earnings management with performance-adjusted
discretionary total accruals, as suggested by Kothari et al. (2005). They show that existing
methods for estimating discretionary accruals are biased toward rejecting the null hypothesis of
no earnings management when the event related to the incentive is associated with performance.
Kothari et al. (2005) recommend adjusting discretionary accruals by subtracting discretionary
accruals of control firms matched on prior-year ROA and industry. Following Kothari et al.
(2005), we match each SEO firm with a non-SEO firm from the same industry (using the twodigit SIC code), with the closest ROA (net income divided by lagged total assets) in the year
ending prior to Q(-1). ADTA is the discretionary accruals of the SEO firm minus the
discretionary accruals of the performance matched, non-SEO firm, summed over Q(-1) to Q(+2)
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and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-1). Discretionary total accruals are estimated by the
cross-sectional modified Jones (1991) model using two-digit SIC codes. Figure 1 shows our
timing convention.

[Insert Figure 1 about here.]

Q(.) represents the quarters around a SEO. The quarter of the last earnings announcement before
the offering announcement is labeled Q(–1). Q(0) is the quarter of the first earnings
announcement after the offering announcement. All other quarters are similarly indexed relative
to the offering announcement. M(.) is the six-month period in which disclosure frequencies are
determined. M(-1) is the last six-month period prior to the SEO announcement, and M(0) is the
first six-month period after the SEO announcement. All other six-month periods are similarly
indexed relative to the offering announcements.

Control variables and the structural model
Considering potential endogeneity, we employ a structural model for an empirical
representation of the relation between disclosure (DL) and earnings management proxied by
performance-adjusted discretionary total accruals (ADTA). To reduce the possibility of model
misspecification due to missing variables, we control for additional variables in the model. King,
Pownall, and Waymire (1990), Lang and Lundholm (1993), and Skinner (1994) find that
disclosure activities are positively associated with firm size and return volatility, and negatively
associated with performance, change of performance, and return-earnings correlation. Thus, we
include these as explanatory variables for the disclosure regressions. Disclosure might vary with
the economic and market environment, corporate governance, and the firm’s ownership structure,
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as well as the availability of other sources of firm information. To capture these effects on
disclosure, we use control variables, including institutional ownership, blockholder ownership,
insider ownership, and the number of analysts following the firm.
Numerous studies have documented that earnings management is negatively associated
with operating cash flow, change in performance, auditor quality, and the absolute value of total
accruals (Dechow, 1994; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and
Subramanyam, 1998). We thus include operating cash flow, change in return on assets (ROA),
auditor quality, and the absolute value of total accruals as explanatory variables. In addition, we
include firm size, leverage, and ownership variables as additional control variables in our
earnings management regressions.
Since an application of ordinary least squares (OLS) to a simultaneous equations model
can yield biased and inconsistent parameter estimates, we employ a three-stage least-squares
(3SLS) regression to estimate the simultaneous model as follows. (The expected signs are noted
above each coefficient.)
DL = a + b1*ADTA + b2*ROA + b3*CROA + b4*AR_bf6m
+
+
+
+ b5*SIZE + b6*RE + b7*STD10YR + b8 *INSTI
+
+
+
+ b9 *BLOCK + b10 *INSIDER + b11 *NUM_ANST + e,

(3)

+
ADTA = a + b1*DL + b2*OCF + b3*CROA + b4*SIZE
+
+
+ b5*LEV + b6*INSTI + b7*BLOCK + b8*INSIDER + b9*NONB6
+ b10*ABSTACC + e

(4)
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where DL is an average percentile rank of the number of press releases per six-month
period over M(-4) through M(+3); ADTA is the annualized performance-adjusted discretionary
total accrual over the period Q(–1) through Q(+2) scaled by lagged total assets; ROA is an
annualized return on assets (ROA) measured as income before extraordinary items summed over
Q(–1) to Q(+2) and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-1); CROA is the changes in
annualized ROA measured as income before extraordinary items summed over Q(+3) to Q(+6)
and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(+3) minus income before extraordinary items summed
over Q(–1) to Q(+2) and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-1); AR_bf6m is the marketadjusted returns over the one-year period ending 6 months before the offering announcement.
Market-adjusted returns are computed by subtracting the return on the value-weighted market
index from firm returns; SIZE is the log of the market value of equity at Q(-1); RE is an annual
return/earnings correlation measured over 10-year period before the offering announcement;
STD10YR is the standard deviation of market-adjusted returns over the 10 years prior to the
offering announcement; INSTI is the percentage ownership of institutional investors; BLOCK is
the percentage ownership of blockholders; INSIDER is the percentage ownership of insiders;
NUM_ANST is the number of analysts’ following the firm; OCF is the operating cash flow over
the period Q(-1) through Q(+2) scaled by the lagged total assets; LEV is the debt-to-equity ratio,
the proxy for the closeness to the violation of lending contracts; NONB6 is an indicator variable,
which is set equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor is not one of big six accounting firms, and 0
otherwise; and ABSTACC is the absolute value of total accruals over the period Q(-1) through
Q(+2) scaled by the lagged total assets.

Measurement of long-term SEO performance
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To examine the long-term SEO performance for up to five years after a SEO, we follow
the Fama & French (1993) three-factor model approach and run the following regression for
individual securities in each group classified based on disclosure and earnings management.
(Rit – Rft) = α + b1 (Rmt – Rft) + b2 SMBt + b3 HMLt + eit

(5)

where Rit is the monthly return of SEO firm i. Rmt – Rft is the market excess return in month t.
SMBt is the difference between the month t return on a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks
and one of large stocks. HMLt is the difference between month t return on a value weighted
portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and one of low book-to-market stocks, and eit is the error
term.

Descriptive statistics
Table I reports the sample statistics and data characteristics for the 1,431 offerings.

[Insert Table I about here.]

Panel A of Table I shows that seasoned equity issues are not clustered by time periods, except
that 1990 carries only 5.8% of the issues. Panels B and C provide summary information on issuer
size and offering characteristics. The mean and median of book value of assets are $988 million
and $146 million, respectively. The mean and median of the equity market capitalization are
$780 million and $200 million, respectively. Issuer size varies considerably as indicated by the
large standard deviation. The mean and median offering proceeds are $81 million and $43
million respectively. The mean increase in shares due to the offering is 26%.

Empirical Results
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Bivariate relations
Before we proceed to the multivariate analysis, it is informative to examine whether the
bivariate relations between disclosure and earnings management are consistent with our
hypotheses. The bivariate correlation coefficients are reported in Table II.

[Insert Table II about here.]

Table II presents the pearson correlation coefficients among the variables used in the regression
analyses. The bivariate correlation coefficient between disclosure and earnings management
variable is significantly negative.8
Figure 2 illustrates the bivariate relations among disclosure, earnings management, and
post-issue performance.
[Insert Figure 2 about here.]

The figure shows the post-issue performance (i.e., market-adjusted returns compounded daily
over the one-year period after the Q(+2) earnings announcement) for different levels of disclosure
when earnings management varies. After controlling for earnings management, post-issue
performance and disclosure are positively correlated, supporting our monitoring hypothesis (a). In
addition, as expected, the greater the disclosure, the lower the earnings management measured by
the ADTA at all levels of the post-issue performance, supporting the information hypothesis.
Overall, this suggests that our bivariate results are consistent with both of our hypotheses.
The simultaneous association between disclosure and earnings management

8

Our unreported results suggest that the negative relation between disclosure and the earnings management variable
does not change with measurements across various time spans or other proxies of earnings management.
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To incorporate the endogenous characteristics of disclosure and earnings management,
we present the results of the 3SLS regressions in Table III.

[Insert Table III about here.]

The 3SLS regression results show that the included variables jointly account for nearly 26% of
the variation in disclosure and earnings management. As hypothesized, there is a significant and
negative, bidirectional relation between disclosure and earnings management. The results show
that the ADTA yields a significant, negative impact on the DL. Likewise, the DL also exerts a
significant, negative influence on the ADTA. Specifically, the estimated regression coefficient
suggests that a 1% increase in the ADTA results in a 0.3715-0.3718% decrease in the DL.
Similarly, we find that a 1% increase in the DL results in a 0.6543-0.8296% decrease in the
ADTA. The combined results provide empirical support for our information hypothesis that
disclosure is a decreasing function of earnings management and earnings management is a
decreasing function of disclosure. The former evidence is consistent with the single-equation
OLS evidence of Jo and Kim (2007). Our unreported results suggest that the results remain
qualitatively unchanged using other proxies of earnings management, such as the discretionary
current accruals (DCA) that Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a, b), Rangan (1998), and DuCharme,
Malatesta, and Sefcik (2004) use, and the discretionary total accruals (DTA) that Hribar and
Collins (2002) suggest. Different measurement windows of accruals and disclosure do not
change the results.
Managers of firms with unusual income-decreasing accruals have a strong incentive to
provide extensive disclosure at the time of an equity offering in order to prevent possible
lawsuits from investors and to make sure that investors do not misinterpret their poor reported

17

performance. Skinner (1994) suggests managers have legal incentives to disclose bad news.
Skinner (1997) also provides evidence on the relation between earnings disclosure and
stockholder litigation. After controlling for confounding factors, he finds that voluntary
disclosures occur more in quarters that result in litigation than in quarters that do not and more
timely disclosure is related to lower settlement amounts.
To rule out this alternative explanation (i.e., firms with unusual income-decreasing
accruals provide extensive disclosure to make sure that investors do not misinterpret their poor
reported performance) of a negative relation between earnings management and disclosure, we
conduct the 3SLS regression using only income-increasing accruals, i.e., positive ADTA only.
The results reported in the right hand side of Table III suggest a strong and negative relation
between ADTA and DL. The relation is statistically insignificant when we conduct the same
tests with samples of income-decreasing discretionary accruals only. Combined together, these
results provide convincing evidence that firms with extensive disclosures are less likely to
manipulate earnings.
Consistent with Skinner’s (1994) finding, we find that performance measured by
annualized ROA and changes in performance measured by changes in annualized ROA are
negatively associated with voluntary disclosure. These results support Skinner’s premise that
firms that are performing poorly disclose more in order to reduce expected legal costs. Our
results also suggest that firm size is positively related to disclosure. This supports Skinner’s
(1994) argument that the dollar values of damages in securities litigation are a positive function
of firm size. The relation between disclosure and the number of analysts following the firm
(NUM_ANST) is also positive. The results are consistent with the finding of Lang and
Lundholm (1996). It seems reasonable to expect that the more analysts following the firm, the
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higher the level of information disclosure because security analysts frequently ask managers to
collect information that they then analyze and publish. Our results reveal, however, that
empirical associations between disclosure and return variables, such as the market adjusted
return (AR_bf6m), the return-earnings correlation (RE), and return volatility (STD10YR), are
weak. The empirical associations between disclosure and the ownership variables of INSTI,
BLOCK, and INSIDER are all weak. We also find that the ADTA is negatively associated with
operating cash flow (OCF) and changes in performance (CROA). These results support the
Dechow’s (1994) finding that discretionary accruals are negatively correlated with operating
cash flows. The negative relation between the ADTA and CROA supports the finding of
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) that earnings are managed to avoid losses and negative changes
in earnings.

Long-term, post-issue SEO return performance
To examine the long-term effect of socially responsible and ethical decisions on postissue performance, we examine the long-term return performance for up to five years after a SEO.
For that task, we first classify our total sample into four groups. In particular, if the average
percentile rank of the number of press releases per six-month period over M(-4) through M(+3),
the DL, is greater than the third quartile value and the ADTA is greater than or equal to the
median value, then the sample is assigned to group 1. If the DL is greater than the third quartile
value and the ADTA is less than the median value, then the sample is classified as belonging to
group 2 (ethical firms choosing high disclosure). If the DL is less than the first quartile value and
the ADTA is greater than or equal to the median value, then the sample is classified as belonging
to group 3 (unethical firms choosing low disclosure). If the DL is less than the first quartile value
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and the ADTA is less than the median value, then the firm is assigned to group 4. According to
our convention, groups 1 and 3 are unethical firms and groups 2 and 4 are ethical firms. Groups 1
and 2 include firms with socially responsible disclosure levels and groups 3 and 4 include firms
with socially irresponsible disclosure levels. Our major interest of comparison is firms with
ethical reporting that choose persistent disclosure vs. firms with unethical reporting that choose
low disclosure.
We then follow the Fama & French (1993) three-factor model approach and run the
regression for individual securities in each group. Table 4 presents the post-issue returns up to
five years after the Q(+2) earnings announcement.

[Insert Table IV about here.]

Buy-and-hold returns are market-adjusted returns compounded daily over the one-year period after
the Q(+2) earnings announcement. The three-factor model α coefficients are alphas from the
Fama & French three-factor model estimated over 12- to 60-month periods after the Q(+2)
earnings announcement. Panel A reports the one-year post-issue returns based upon buy-andhold returns and three-factor model α coefficients for up to five years for various groups. Panel
B reports the results of the difference tests of long-term, post-issue returns across the various
groups.
Interestingly, evidence suggests that firms with high disclosure and low earnings
management (group 2) perform significantly better than firms with low disclosure and high
earnings management (group 3) over the five-year period. For instance, the means of the monthly
abnormal returns estimated over 12 and 60 months for group 2, based upon the Fama & French
three-factor model, are higher (less negative) than those of group 3 by 16.88% and 14.76% per
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year, respectively.9 In addition, over the five-year period, firms with high disclosure and high
earnings management (group 1) have consistently higher α coefficients than those of firms with
low disclosure and high earnings management. For example, the means of monthly

α coefficients estimated over 12 and 60 months for group 1 are higher than those of group 3 by
6.58% and 14.09% per year, respectively. These results indicate that firms with extensive
disclosure substantially reduce their post-issue SEO underperformance over the long run. Our
unreported analysis suggests that these results remain qualitatively similar with slightly weaker
significance when we use different cut-off points, such as medians for both variables of DL and
ADTA.
From these results, we maintain that the impact of voluntary disclosure lasts for a
substantial time period because the information effect alone cannot sustain significant
differences in returns among groups for up to five years after a SEO. However, there is no
significant difference between firms with high disclosure and high earnings management (group
1) and firms with high disclosure and low earnings management (group 2). It seems that among
high-disclosure firms, earnings management alone does not change long-term, post-issue
performance. These results are understandable because investors can see through earnings
management after the offering when enough information is revealed through persistent and
frequent, transparency-increasing disclosures. In addition, comparison between groups 3 and 4
suggests that when disclosure level is relatively low, post-offering SEO underperformance is
more severe when earnings management is aggressive. Overall, the evidence from the

9

We calculate the post-issue annual return differences between groups 2 and 3 based upon the numbers reported in
Panel A of Table 4 as follows: [(-0.00572) – (-0.01979)] x 12 = 0.1688 and [(-0.00063) – (-0.01293)] x 12 = 0.1476.
Similarly, we compute the post-issue annual return differences between groups 1 and 3 as [(-0.01431) – (-0.01979)]
x 12 = 0.0658 and [(-0.00119) – (-0.01293)] x 12 = 0.1409.
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comparisons between group 1 and group 3, between group 2 and group 3, and between groups 3
and 4 are consistent with our monitoring hypothesis.
However, the difference tests of high- and low-disclosure firms among firms with low
earnings management (i.e., group 2 and group 4) suggest insignificant results.

While the

explanations regarding the insignificant difference between groups 2 and 4 are not readily
apparent, we conjecture that when earnings management is relatively low, the impact of
disclosure on post-offering performance is not substantial, presumably because the post-issue
underperformance of firms with conservative earnings management is not severe.
Disclosure made in different periods might affect equity offering firms’ earnings
manipulation differently. To check the robustness of our results taking the timing differences into
account, we classify our total sample into four groups based on average percentile rank of the
number of press releases per six-month period over the M(-4) through M(0) period (before the
offering) instead of M(-4) through M(+3) (around the offering).

[Insert Table V about here.]

The results reported in Table V suggest that the results from the comparison between
group 1 and group 3 based upon M(-4) through M(0) period remain significant over 3, 4, and 5
years. In addition, the results from the comparison between group 2 and group 3 remain
significant over 1, 2, 4, and 5 years after a SEO and comparison between groups 3 and 4 shows
significant difference over 2, 3, 4, and 5 years after a SEO. Although the results from the M(-4)
through M(0) period seem slightly weaker than the results from the M(-4) through M(+3) period,
they are still significant up to five years. Insignificant results of the difference tests between group
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1 and group 2 and between group 2 and group 4 remain the same over the M(-4) through M(0)
period.
While it is not completely possible to distinguish the information effect from the
monitoring effect, the information effect alone cannot last for up to five years after a SEO.
Fama’s (1970) efficient market hypothesis suggests that stock prices fully reflect all relevant
information instantaneously, and it is difficult for anyone to consistently outperform the market
averages. Consequently, we claim that the evidence of long-term, post-issue SEO performance
supports the monitoring explanation and the view that corporate conduct grounded in social
responsibility and ethical decisions eventually pays.

Additional tests
The previous section shows that based upon the Fama & French (1993) three-factor
model, the long-term underperformance of SEOs is significantly lower for ethical firms choosing
extensive disclosure than unethical firms choosing low disclosure. To examine the impact of
disclosure and earnings management on long-term SEO performance further, we perform the
following additional regressions.
We run regressions using post-issue returns up to five years after Q(+2) earnings
announcement as dependent variables and DL, ADTA, and other firm characteristics including
firm size (SIZE), book-to-market ratio (BM), and leverage (LEV) as the explanatory variables.
Our results reported in Panel A of Table VI show that the coefficients on ADTA are significant
and negative over all five estimation periods. While positive over all five estimation periods, the
coefficients on DL are significant in the regressions estimated over 12-, 24- and 60-month
periods. The coefficients on SIZE are all significantly positive while the coefficients on BM and
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LEV are mostly insignificant except that of BM estimated over 12 months. We also run
regressions using post-issue returns up to five years after Q(+2) earnings announcement as
dependent variables and various interaction dummy variables representing four groups in Table
IV and other firm characteristics variables of SIZE, BM, and LEV as the explanatory variables.
The intercept represents the returns for the firms in the middle two quartiles (second and third
quartiles) of disclosure distribution, and therefore the coefficients on group dummy variables can
be understood as the difference between returns for a specific group and returns for this base
group. The results reported in Panel B suggest that consistent with the results reported in Table
IV, the coefficient on the group dummy representing low disclosure-high earnings management
firms (LDL_HEM) is most negative and statistically significant over all estimation windows
except the first year. The coefficient on high disclosure and low earnings management group
(HDL_LEM) is positive, but significant only in the first year.

The coefficients on high

disclosure and high earnings management group (HDL_HEM) and those on low disclosure and
low earnings management group (LDM_LEM) are insignificant. Combined together, these
results suggest that the market penalty over the long-term is most substantial for the firms with
aggressive earnings management and socially irresponsible disclosure (LDL_HEM), supporting
our monitoring hypothesis (b).

Conclusions
In this article, we address complex issues of ethics and disclosure using a sample of
seasoned equity offering firms. We attempt to examine these complicated matters from the
viewpoint of three academic areas, including business ethics, accounting, and finance.
Specifically, we examine whether socially responsible disclosure decisions of seasoned equity
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offering firms and unethical earnings manipulations are endogenously determined. We also
examine whether the long-term, equity market values SEO firms’ socially responsible and ethical
decisions. We maintain that the relations among ethics, disclosure, and long-term financial
performance can be understood when we view socially responsible issuing firms as those with
extensive voluntary disclosure and ethical firms as firms with limited earnings management.
We find that disclosure is endogenously determined and negatively associated with
earnings management and vice versa. Our findings support the premise that extensive disclosure
reduces information asymmetry, exposes unethical earnings manipulation, and therefore, reduces
the incentive to manage earnings in SEO firms.
While the theory of agency and disclosure has been perhaps one of the most important
areas in the study of corporate finance and accounting, direct empirical evidence on the issue is
scarce. In particular, only a few studies examine the effect of disclosure on corporate
performance. In this study, we provide evidence on this issue. Specifically, we find that socially
responsible disclosure activities around the announcement of a SEO positively affect long-term,
post-issue performance. Interestingly, we find that ethical firms disclosing extensively provide
considerably higher returns than firms managing their earnings but disclosing less, even up to
five years after a SEO. We interpret this evidence to mean that the information effect alone is not
sufficient to explain long-term, post-offering performance issues. Instead, we maintain that the
effect of monitoring on post-issue performance lasts for a long period of time and that the
financial market values corporate efforts toward social responsibility.
These findings support the notion that greater disclosure helps reduce information
asymmetry, enhances the transparency of earnings by increased monitoring, reduces agency
costs from the separation of ownership and control, and reduces long-term, post-issue SEO
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underperformance. The direction of this relation is consistent with the common intuition that
corporate efforts to incorporate social responsibility, such as improving the transparency of the
information environment through voluntary disclosure, will eventually improve firm
performance. The results of this study also suggest that the supply of corporate information is
determined, in part, by SEO firms’ post-issue performance considerations, presumably due to
their reputation concerns.
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Appendix A: Calculation of disclosure level (DL)
We first obtain the number of press releases for each six-month period around SEO announcement by
searching DJI database system. To obtain a measure of disclosure comparable across time periods, we
convert the number of press releases to average percentile rank. We show an example below.
Observation #1
6 month periods
Calendar year assigned
for the annual ranking
Number of PRs

SEO
4/18/1995
M(-24, -18) M(-18, -12)

1993
8

1994
6

M(-12, -6)

M(-6, 0)

M(0, +6)

1994
9

1995
10

1995
9

Observation #2
6 month periods
Calendar year assigned
for the annual ranking
Number of PRs

M(-24, -18) M(-18, -12)

1993
22

1994
21

M(-12, -6)

M(-6, 0)

M(0, +6)

1994
24

1995
30

1995
28

M(-24, -18) M(-18, -12)

1994
6

1995
6

M(-12, -6)

M(-6, 0)

M(0, +6)

1995
6

1996
9

1996
8

1997
11

M(+6, +12) M(+12, +18) M(+18, +24)

1996
32

1996
33

1997
33

M(+6, +12) M(+12, +18) M(+18, +24)

1997
9

1997
9

1998
8

SEO
11/3/1997
M(-24, -18) M(-18, -12)

1995
13

1996
13

M(-12, -6)

M(-6, 0)

M(0, +6)

1996
14

1997
17

1997
15

Number of samples in 1996:

M(+6, +12) M(+12, +18) M(+18, +24)

1998
18

1998
18

1999
19

Number of PRs

annual rank

annual percentile rank*

11
12
32
33
9
8
13
14

3
4
7
8
2
1
5
6

0.2857
0.4286
0.8571
1
0.1486
0
0.5714
0.7143

1996 PRs from Observation #1 M(+6, +12)
from Observation #1 M(+12, +18)
from Observation #2 M(+6, +12)
from Observation #2 M(+12, +18)
from Observation #3 M(-6, 0)
from Observation #3 M(0, +6)
from Observation #4 M(-18, -12)
from Observation #4 M(-12, -6)

*

1996
12

SEO
7/20/1996

Observation #4
6 month periods
calendar year assigned
for the annual ranking
Number of PRs

1996
11

SEO
9/7/1995

Observation #3
6 month periods
Calendar year assigned
for the annual ranking
Number of PRs

M(+6, +12) M(+12, +18) M(+18, +24)

8

(annual rank-1) / (number of samples each year – 1)

This Appendix A is borrowed from Jo and Kim (2007).
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TABLE I
Sample characteristics of seasoned equity offerings
Panel A: Time Distribution
Year

Freq

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997

83
190
173
200
149
189
231
216

% Cum Freq

%

5.80
13.28
12.09
13.98
10.41
13.21
16.14
15.09

83
5.80
273 19.08
446 31.17
646 45.15
795 55.56
984 68.77
1,215 84.91
1,431 100.00

STD

Median

Panel B: Size characteristics
Mean

First quartile

Third Quartile

Total assets

987.5879

3,641.0980

146.2965

43.3660

544.4810

Market value of equity

780.3003

2,907.0380

199.8094

81.8935

611.3351

Book value of equity

291.8861

918.6333

62.1460

19.3850

202.5740

Mean

STD

Median

First quartile

Third Quartile

81.1986

131.9153

42.7880

19.2000

90.0000

Offer size

0.2607

0.3212

0.1901

0.1125

0.3096

Offer size (in amounts)

0.2972

0.3830

0.2010

0.1158

0.3549

Panel C: Offer Characteristics

Offer amount

This table summarizes our sample of 1,431 seasoned equity offerings of common stock by US industrial firms over
the period 1990 through 1997. We terminate our sample in 1997 in order to examine post-offering returns up to five
years after the offerings, i.e., up to 2002. The total assets, market value of equity and book value of equity are
measured at the end of the quarter before the offering announcement. The total assets, market value of equity, book
value of equity and offer amount are measured in millions of dollars. Offer size is measured as the number of shares
offered divided by the number of pre-offering shares outstanding. Offer size (in amounts) is measured as the offer
amount divided by the market value of equity.
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TABLE II
Bivariate correlations
DL
ADTA
ROA
CROA
AR_bf6m
SIZE
RE
STD10YR

ADTA

ROA

CROA

SIZE

RE

STD10yr

NUM_ANST

OCF

LEV

NONB6

-0.0853 **
-0.0288

-0.0979 **

0.0041

0.0911 **

-0.0259

0.0299

0.4711 ***

-0.1311 ***

0.0043

-0.0180

-0.0459

0.0179

-0.7647 ***
0.1129 ***

-0.0761 ***

0.1879 ***

-0.0865 ***

0.1731 ***

-0.0740 **

0.0249

-0.0441

-0.0433

0.4533 ***

-0.1576 ***

0.0501 *

-0.0793 ***

0.6775 ***

-0.0530 *

-0.0338

NUM_ANST

0.4326 ***

-0.1017 ***

0.1369 ***

-0.0607 **

OCF
LEV

0.0318

-0.3205 ***

0.7710 ***

-0.5169 ***

NONB6
ABSTACC

AR_bf6m

0.0224

0.0128

0.0316

0.2136 ***

-0.0555 *

0.2039 ***

0.0005

0.0123

-0.0485 *

-0.0104

0.0227

-0.0111

0.0327

-0.0620 **

-0.1830 ***

0.0186

-0.0084

-0.2035 ***

-0.0160

-0.1159 ***

0.1189 ***

-0.0116

0.0066

-0.0769 **

0.1342 ***

-0.5155 ***

0.5246 ***

0.0872 ***

0.0030

0.2606 ***

-0.1613 ***

0.0565 *

0.0128

-0.1229 ***

-0.0867***

0.0075

-0.1536 ***

-0.4155***

0.0002

0.1369 ***

This table shows pearson correlation coefficients among select variables. ADTA is annualized performance adjusted discretionary total accruals over the period
Q(–1) through Q(+2) scaled by lagged total assets. DTA is annualized discretionary total accruals over the period Q(–1) through Q(+2) scaled by lagged total
assets. Panel B presents pearson correlation coefficients among variables used in the regression analyses. DL: average percentile rank of the number of press
releases per six-month period over M(-4) through M(+3); ADTA: annualized performance adjusted discretionary total accruals over the period Q(–1) through
Q(+2) scaled by lagged total assets; ROA: annualized ROA measured as income before extraordinary items summed over Q(–1) to Q(+2) and scaled by assets at
the beginning of Q(-1); CROA: changes in annualized ROA measured as income before extraordinary items summed over Q(+3) to Q(+6) and scaled by assets at
the beginning of Q(+3) - income before extraordinary items summed over Q(–1) to Q(+2) and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-1); AR_bf6m: marketadjusted returns over one-year period ending 6 months before the offering announcement. Market-adjusted returns are computed by subtracting the return on the
value-weighted market index from firm returns; SIZE: log of the market value of equity at Q(-1); RE: annual return/earnings correlation measured over the10
year period before the offering announcement; STD10YR: standard deviation of market-adjusted returns over 10 years prior to the offering announcement;
NUM_ANST: the number of analysts’ following; OCF: operating cash flows over the period Q(-1) through Q(+2) scaled by the lagged total assets; LEV: debtto-equity ratio, the proxy for the closeness to the violation of lending contracts; NONB6: indicator variable, which is set to equal 1 if the firm’s auditor is not one
of big six accounting firms, and 0 otherwise; ABSTACC: absolute value of total accruals over the period Q(-1) through Q(+2) scaled by the lagged total assets.
***, **, * significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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TABLE III
Regression results of simultaneous equation model of disclosure and earnings management
Independent
variables
Intercept

Dependent variable: DL
Full sample
0.19432
0.14707
(4.15) ***
(4.50)
-0.37184
-0.37151
(-4.56)
(-3.37) ***
-0.26848
-0.25830
(-7.22)
(-5.86) ***
-0.13849
-0.17715
(-2.14) **
(-3.32)
-0.00801
(-0.82)
0.05637
0.06123
(9.33)
(6.00) ***
0.00713
(0.46)
0.01079
(0.61)
-0.06901
(-1.25)
-0.02403
(-0.59)
-0.00129
(-0.02)
0.00558
0.00419
(2.84) ***
(2.82)

ADTA
ROA
CROA
AR_bf6m
SIZE
RE
STD10YR
INSTI
BLOCK
INSIDER
NUM_ANST

Independent
variables
Intercept

***
***
***

***

***

Dependent variable: ADTA
0.06415
(1.11)
-0.65433
(-3.91)
-0.30236
(-6.28)
-0.12401
(-1.90)
0.05589
(4.14)
-0.00057
(-0.60)
-0.00924
(-1.70)
-0.00193
(-0.47)
0.00524
(0.93)
-0.00889
(-0.27)
0.01511
(0.02)

DL
OCF
CROA
SIZE
LEV
INSTI
BLOCK
INSIDER
NONB6
ABSTACC

Number of observations
System Weighted R

***

2

***
***
*
***

0.08371
(1.91)
-0.82955
(-4.83)
-0.31391
(-7.24)
-0.18156
(-3.04)
0.06315
(4.67)
0.00014
(0.41)

*
***
***
***
***

*

0.00471
(0.21)
0.43309
(0.82)

Dependent variable: DL
With positive ADTA only
0.15482
017255
(2.41) **
(3.54)
-0.40354
-0.29466
(-2.70) ***
(-2.27)
-0.29627
-0.30051
(-4.54) ***
(-5.40)
-0.13259
-0.19665
(-1.40)
(-2.51)
0.00171
(0.14)
0.06693
0.05804
(5.15) ***
(6.16)
0.00170
(0.09)
0.02811
(1.32)
-0.09910
(-1.31)
-0.01194
(-0.23)
0.02894
(0.41)
0.00415
0.00587
(1.56)
(2.70)
Dependent variable: ADTA
With positive ADTA only
0.07588
010283
(1.13)
(2.22)
-0.61231
-0.59262
(-2.39) **
(-3.08)
-0.30061
-0.32084
(-4.90) ***
(-6.51)
-0.1753
-0.20115
(-1.92) *
(-2.89)
0.05651
0.04369
(2.56) **
(2.73)
0.00105
0.00009
(0.37)
(0.28)
-0.14705
(-2.06) **
-0.00809
(-0.16)
0.05990
(0.88)
0.05551
0.02976
(1.35)
(1.08)
1.60767
2.05000
(1.70) *
(2.89)

459

627

272

356

22.54%

26.43%

27.61%

29.68%
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***
**
***
***

***

***

**
***
***
***
***

***

This table reports the results of association tests between disclosure and discretionary accruals of SEO
firms. The following equations are estimated using three-stage simultaneous equation system:
1) DL = a + b1 ADTA + b2 ROA + b3 CROA + b4 AR_bf6m + b5 SIZE + b6 RE + b7 STD10YR + b8 INSTI
+ b9 BLOCK + b10 INSIDER + b11 NUM_ANST
2) ADTA = a + b1 DL + b2 OCF + b3 CROA + b4 SIZE + b5 LEV + b6 INSTI + b7 BLOCK + b8 INSIDER
+ b9 NONB6 +b10 ABSTACC
where DL: average percentile rank of the number of press releases per six-month period over M(-4)
through M(+3); ADTA: annualized performance adjusted discretionary total accruals over the period Q(–1)
through Q(+2) scaled by lagged total assets; ROA: annualized ROA measured as income before
extraordinary items summed over Q(–1) to Q(+2) and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-1); CROA:
changes in annualized ROA measured as income before extraordinary items summed over Q(+3) to Q(+6)
and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(+3) - income before extraordinary items summed over Q(–1) to
Q(+2) and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-1); AR_bf6m: market-adjusted returns over one-year
period ending 6 months before the offering announcement. Market-adjusted returns are computed by
subtracting the return on the value-weighted market index from firm returns; SIZE: log of the market value
of equity at Q(-1); RE: annual return/earnings correlation measured over the10 year period before the
offering announcement; STD10YR: standard deviation of market-adjusted returns over 10 years prior to the
offering announcement; INSTI: percentage ownership of institutional investors; BLOCK: percentage
ownership of blockholders; INSIDER: percentage ownership of insiders; NUM_ANST: the number of
analysts’ following; OCF: operating cash flows over the period Q(-1) through Q(+2) scaled by the lagged
total assets; LEV: debt-to-equity ratio, the proxy for the closeness to the violation of lending contracts;
NONB6: indicator variable, which is set to equal 1 if the firm’s auditor is not one of big six accounting
firms, and 0 otherwise; ABSTACC: absolute value of total accruals over the period Q(-1) through Q(+2)
scaled by the lagged total assets. ***, **, * significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in two-sided
significance tests, respectively. t-values are in the parentheses.
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TABLE IV
Long term, post-issue return performance and difference tests over the M(-4) through M(+3) period
Panel A: post-issue returns
Group 1 (High DL, High EM)
Mean
Median

Group 2 (High DL, Low EM)
Mean
Median

Group 3 (Low DL, High EM)
Mean
Median

Group 4 (Low DL, Low EM)
Mean
Median

1 year Buy-and-hold returns
-0.11167 *
-0.06686
-0.04766
-0.10595 ***
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 12 months
-0.00726
-0.00572
-0.01431 **
-0.00500
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 24 months
-0.00587 **
-0.00487 **
-0.00696
-0.00348 **
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 36 months
-0.00261
-0.00627 **
-0.00444
-0.00476 **
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 48 months
-0.00129
-0.00212
-0.00286
-0.00256
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 60 months
-0.00204
-0.00063
-0.00119
-0.00112

-0.17627

***

-0.23568

***

0.03602

-0.09697

-0.01979

***

-0.01275

***

-0.01242

0.00458

-0.01655

***

-0.00929

***

-0.00363

0.00502

-0.01524

***

-0.00881

***

-0.00220

0.00359

-0.01405

***

-0.00536

***

-0.00367

-0.00081

-0.01293

***

-0.00437

***

-0.00387

-0.00011

Panel B: P-values from the One-tailed T-tests between groups
1 year Buy-and-hold returns
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 12 months
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 24 months
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 36 months
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 48 months
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 60 months

Group 1 vs. 3

Group 2 vs. 3

Group 1 vs. 2

Group 3 vs. 4

0.0596*
0.2732
0.0879*
0.0426**
0.0332**
0.0267**

0.0815*
0.0426**
0.0260**
0.0583*
0.0191**
0.0149**

0.4128
0.2788
0.3451
0.3474
0.4316
0.4467

0.0278**
0.2102
0.0634*
0.0522*
0.0974*
0.1236

This table presents the post-issue returns up to five years after Q(+2) earnings announcement. Buy-and-hold returns are market-adjusted returns compounded daily
over the one-year period after the Q(+2) earnings announcement. Three-factor model α coefficients are alphas from the Fama-French three-factor model estimated
over 12 to 60 month periods after the Q(+2) earnings announcement. The following regression is estimated for each firm: (Rit – Rft) = α + b1 (Rmt – Rft) + b2
SMBt + b3 HMLt + eit where Rit is monthly return of SEO firm in 12 to 60 month periods after the Q(+2) earnings announcement. ADTA: performance-adjusted
annualized discretionary total accruals over the period Q(–1) through Q(+2) scaled by lagged total assets. Following Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005), we create
a control sample based on ROA in the quarter before SEO announcement and industry (two-digit SIC code) for each offering. The ADTA for a SEO firm is the
discretionary total accruals for that firm minus the discretionary total accruals of the matched non-SEO firm. If average percentile rank of the number of press
releases per six-month period over M(-4) through M(+3) is greater than the third quartile value and ADTA is greater than or equal to the median value, then the
sample is assigned into group 1. If average percentile rank of the number of press releases per six-month period over M(-4) through M(+3) is greater than the third
quartile value and ADTA is less than the median value, then the sample is classified into group 2. If average percentile rank of the number of press releases per
six-month period over M(-4) through M(+3) is less than the first quartile value and ADTA is greater than or equal to the median value, then the sample is
classified into group 3. If average percentile rank of the number of press releases per six-month period over M(-4) through M(+3) is less than the first quartile value
and ADTA is less than the median value, then the sample is classified into group 4. ***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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TABLE V
Robustness check: Long term, post-issue return performance and difference tests over the M(-4) through M(0) period
Panel A: post-issue returns
Group 1 (High DL, High EM)
Group 2 (High DL, Low EM)
Mean
Median
Mean
Median
1 year Buy-and-hold returns
-0.09948
-0.03056
-0.04393
-0.07490
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 12 months
-0.00349
-0.00416
-0.01235
-0.00460
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 24 months
-0.00318
-0.00378
-0.00452
-0.00361
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 36 months
-0.00135
-0.00510 *
-0.00238
-0.00422
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 48 months
-0.00156
-0.00127
-0.02431
-0.00344
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 60 months
-0.00020
-0.00010
-0.00115
-0.00106

Group 3 (Low DL, High EM)
Mean
Median

Group 4 (Low DL, Low EM)
Mean
Median

-0.16558

***

-0.24334

***

0.04500

-0.05102

-0.01400

***

-0.00730

***

-0.00948

0.00387

-0.01152

***

-0.00696

***

-0.00095

0.00502

-0.01019

***

-0.00604

**

-0.00230

0.00165

-0.00932

**

-0.00372

**

-0.00071

-0.00081

-0.00849

**

-0.00351

*

0.00056

0.00305

Panel B: P-values from the One-tailed T-tests between groups
1 year Buy-and-hold returns
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 12 months
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 24 months
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 36 months
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 48 months
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 60 months

Group 1 vs. 3

Group 2 vs. 3

Group 1 vs. 2

Group 3 vs. 4

0.0846*
0.4261
0.1438
0.0765*
0.0910*
0.0715*

0.0631*
0.0650*
0.0652*
0.1364
0.0413**
0.0287**

0.4450
0.1764
0.4491
0.2937
0.3984
0.4014

0.0223**
0.2853
0.0586*
0.0998*
0.0829*
0.0722*

This table presents the post-issue returns up to five years after Q(+2) earnings announcement. Buy-and-hold returns are market-adjusted returns compounded daily
over the one-year period after the Q(+2) earnings announcement. Three-factor model α coefficients are alphas from the Fama-French three-factor model estimated
over 12 to 60 month periods after the Q(+2) earnings announcement. The following regression is estimated for each firm: (Rit – Rft) = α + b1 (Rmt – Rft) + b2
SMBt + b3 HMLt + eit where Rit is monthly return of SEO firm in 12 to 60 month periods after the Q(+2) earnings announcement. ADTA: performance-adjusted
annualized discretionary total accruals over the period Q(–1) through Q(+2) scaled by lagged total assets. Following Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005), we create
a control sample based on ROA in the quarter before SEO announcement and industry (two-digit SIC code) for each offering. The ADTA for a SEO firm is the
discretionary total accruals for that firm minus the discretionary total accruals of the matched non-SEO firm. If average percentile rank of the number of press
releases per six-month period over M(-4) through M(0) is greater than the third quartile value and ADTA is greater than or equal to the median value, then the
sample is assigned into group 1. If average percentile rank of the number of press releases per six-month period over M(-4) through M(0) is greater than the third
quartile value and ADTA is less than the median value, then the sample is classified into group 2. If average percentile rank of the number of press releases per
six-month period over M(-4) through M(0) is less than the first quartile value and ADTA is greater than or equal to the median value, then the sample is classified
into group 3. If average percentile rank of the number of press releases per six-month period over M(-4) through M(0) is less than the first quartile value and ADTA
is less than the median value, then the sample is classified into group 4. ***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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TABLE VI
Regression analyses: Long term, post-issue return performance on disclosure and earnings management
Panel A: Regression with continuous variables
Dependent variables
Intercept
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model
estimated over 12 months
-0.0475
(-5.46)***
estimated over 24 months
-0.0300
(-4.55)***
estimated over 36 months
-0.0211
(-2.96)**
estimated over 48 months
-0.0244
(-3.63)***
estimated over 60 months
-0.0240
(-4.05)***

DL

ADTA

0.0135
(1.71)*
0.0126
(2.02)**
0.0047
(0.72)
0.0080
(1.31)
0.0096
(1.69)*

-0.0197
(-2.25)**
-0.0167
(-2.37)**
-0.0205
(-2.79)***
-0.0247
(-3.58)***
-0.0214
(-3.32)***

HDL_HEM

HDL_LEM

0.0006
(0.10)
0.0034
(0.67)
0.0056
(1.06)
0.0037
(0.73)
0.0047
(0.96)

0.0115
(2.01)**
0.0068
(1.47)
0.0017
(0.35)
0.0030
(0.65)
0.0032
(0.70)

Independent variables
SIZE
BM
0.0040
(2.41)**
0.0024
(2.00)**
0.0031
(2.30)**
0.0044
(3.45)***
0.0025
(2.35)**

0.0106
(2.21)**
0.0022
(0.58)
-0.0021
(-0.53)
-0.0042
(-1.11)
-0.0001
(-0.03)

Adjusted
LEV

R2

0.0001
(0.57)
0.0001
(0.64)
0.0001
(1.25)
0.0001
(0.51)
0.0001
(0.45)

0.0253
0.0180
0.0186
0.0408
0.0298

Panel B: Regression with group dummies
Dependent variables
Intercept
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model
estimated over 12 months
-0.0408
(-5.17)***
estimated over 24 months
-0.0253
(-4.08)***
estimated over 36 months
-0.0198
(-2.99)***
estimated over 48 months
-0.0204
(-3.21)***
estimated over 60 months
-0.0254
(-4.06)***

Independent variables
LDL_HEM
LDL_LEM
-0.0073
(-1.28)
-0.0092
(-1.96)**
-0.0113
(-2.30)**
-0.0123
(-2.61)***
-0.0084
(-1.86)*

-0.0007
(-0.10)
-0.0003
(-0.05)
0.0047
(0.84)
-0.0002
(-0.04)
-0.0011
(-0.21)

Adjusted
SIZE

BM

LEV

R2

0.0036
(2.10)**
0.0025
(1.92)*
0.0030
(2.06)**
0.0042
(3.01)***
0.0030
(2.76)***

0.0106
(2.10)**
0.0027
(0.64)
-0.0010
(-0.23)
-0.0031
(-0.75)
0.0018
(0.46)

0.0001
(0.34)
0.0001
(0.35)
0.0001
(0.81)
0.0001
(0.12)
0.0001
(0.11)

0.0144
0.0092
0.0121
0.0204
0.0211

This table presents the regression of post-issue returns up to five years after Q(+2) earnings announcement on disclosure and earnings management. Three-factor
model α coefficients are alphas from the Fama-French three-factor model estimated over 12 to 60 month periods after the Q(+2) earnings announcement. The
following regression is estimated for each firm: (Rit – Rft) = α + b1 (Rmt – Rft) + b2 SMBt + b3 HMLt + eit where Rit is monthly return of SEO firm in 12 to 60
month periods after the Q(+2) earnings announcement. DL: average percentile rank of the number of press releases per six-month period over M(-4) through
M(+3); ADTA: annualized performance adjusted discretionary total accruals over the period Q(–1) through Q(+2) scaled by lagged total assets; HDL_HEM: one
if DL is greater than the third quartile value and ADTA is greater than or equal to the median value, zero otherwise; SIZE: log of the market value of equity at
Q(-1); BM: book value of equity divided by the market value of equity at Q(-1); LEV: debt-to-equity ratio; HDL_HEM: one if DL is greater than the third
quartile value and ADTA is less than the median value, zero otherwise; LDL_HEM: one if DL is less than the first quartile value and ADTA is greater than or
equal to the median value, zero otherwise; LDL_LEM: one if DL is less than the first quartile value and ADTA is less than the median value, zero otherwise. In
Panel B, the intercept captures the returns for firms with two middle quartile (second and third quartiles) values of DLs. ***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively. t-values are in the parentheses.

37

Figure 1. Time line of seasoned equity offerings.
This figure shows our timing convention. Q(.) represents the quarters around a SEO. The quarter of the last earnings announcement before the offering
announcement is labeled Q(–1). Q(0) is the quarter of the first earnings announcement after the offering announcement. All other quarters are similarly indexed
relative to the offering announcement. M(.) is the six-month period in which disclosure frequencies are determined. M(-1) is the last six-month period prior to
the SEO announcement, and M(0) is the first six-month period after the SEO announcement. All other six-month periods are similarly indexed relative to the
offering announcement. Eann stands for earnings announcement. We measure post-issue returns by compounding daily market-adjusted returns over the oneyear period after the Q(+2) earnings announcement. The figure also illustrates important event dates and periods around SEO. 1933 Securities Act prohibits any
“offer to sell” prior to the filing of the registration statement before the file of the offer. It also prohibits any sales prior to the effective date. The period between
the date of file and the effective date is “Waiting Period”. The average Waiting Period in Rangan (1998) is 35 days. In our sample the average Waiting Period is
49 days and the median is 35 days. Lock-up agreements between issuing firms and their underwriters prevent insiders at issuing firms from selling their holdings
until 90 to 180 days after the offering date.
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Figure 2. Relationship among disclosure, earnings management, and post-issue returns.
This figure illustrates bivariate relationship among disclosure, earnings management, and the post-issue performance
of SEO firms. AR1Y is market adjusted returns compounded daily over the one-year period after the Q(+2) earnings
announcement. DL, our measure of disclosure frequency, is average percentile rank of the number of press releases
per six-month period over M(-4) through M(+3). ADTA, our measure of earnings management, are annualized
performance-adjusted discretionary total accruals over the period Q(-1) through Q(+2) scaled by lagged assets. For a
better presentation, ADTA is converted to the standardized percentile rank. We first rank ADTA and convert it to
percentiles by taking (rank-1)/(number of samples-1). We then standardize the percentile by taking (percentile rank –
0.5) / 0.5, so that the final measure falls in the range between –1 and 1.
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